A note of
subject-decomposing on Ralph Barton Perry's
thinking on axiology: for MBA students
Highlight 8 ideas of Ralph Barton Perry's book of General
Theory of Value (1926) and 2 claims of it in terms of Toulmin's model of
argument.
Ralph Barton
Perry’s General Theory of Value argues that value is not an
abstract property floating free of human life, but something grounded in interest:
an object becomes valuable when it is taken up by some subject’s purposive
concern. In Toulmin’s terms, Perry’s central thesis can be treated as a claim
supported by his analysis of human motivation and action.
Eight core ideas
1.
Value is tied to
interest. Perry’s
basic formula is that an object has value when interest is taken in it, or more
simply, “X is valuable = interest is taken in X”.
2.
Value is
relational, not absolute. A thing
counts as valuable only in relation to an interested subject, so value is a
specific relation rather than an isolated property.
3.
Interest is more
than liking. Perry uses
“interest” broadly to cover liking, desire, aversion, will, refusal, seeking,
and avoiding.
4.
Human action is
purposive. He treats
interest as bound up with action directed toward expected outcomes, not random
behavior.
5.
Expectation
matters. A person’s
bias toward an object is shaped by what they expect from it, not just by the
object itself.
6.
Governing
propensity guides choice. Interest is
organized by a dominant set or orientation that determines what counts as
useful, threatening, or desirable.
7.
Means and ends are
both value-laden. An object
can be valuable as an end in itself or as a means to some further end.
8.
Values can be
positive or negative. Perry’s
framework includes attraction and repulsion, approval and disapproval, not only
admiration or preference.
Two Toulmin-style claims
|
Toulmin
element
|
Perry-based
claim
|
How
it works
|
|
Toulmin
element
|
Perry-based
claim
|
How
it works
|
|
Claim 1
|
Value is
constituted by interest.
|
This is Perry’s main
conclusion: if interest is taken in something, that thing is valuable in the
basic sense .
|
|
Claim 2
|
A person’s
valuation can be explained by the governing propensity behind their purposive
action.
|
The warrant is Perry’s
psychology of action: what a person expects and aims at determines what they
treat as valuable .
|
|
|
|
|
|
Brief Toulmin mapping
For the first
claim, the grounds are Perry’s analysis of ordinary valuation
and his definition of value as “object of any interest,” while the warrant is
that human beings consistently invest objects with worth through concern and
response. For the second claim, the grounds are Perry’s account
of purposive action, expectation, and governing propensity, and the warrant is
that motives shape what people select, pursue, and rank as important. Toulmin’s
model identifies a claim, supporting grounds, and a warrant that links them.
How are the 8 ideas of Ralph Barton Perry related to the
axiology sub-topic on aesthetics?
Ralph Barton
Perry’s eight axiological ideas are directly related to aesthetics because
he treats aesthetic value as one special realm of “value‑in‑interest” within
his broader theory.
1. Value as interest taken in an object
Perry’s core
formula “X is valuable = interest is taken in X” applies to aesthetic
objects (artworks, landscapes, performances).
·
Aesthetic value
then becomes the value of something when it engages “aesthetic
interest”—a kind of attention that is not merely practical or moral, but
focused on form, expression, and beauty.
2. Value as relational, not absolute
Aesthetic value is
not stuck inside the painting or poem, but arises in the relation
between the artwork and an experiencing subject.
·
What looks
“beautiful” or “moving” to one observer may be indifferent to another, which fits
Perry’s insistence that value depends on the subject–object relation of
interest.
3. Interest is broader than liking
Perry’s richer
notion of interest (including attraction, aversion, expectation, and purposive
attention) fits how people engage with art.
·
A viewer may
feel fascinated, disturbed, or repelled by an artwork, yet
still treat it as aesthetically valuable; this shows that aesthetic value is
not simple “liking,” but a complex affective–cognitive interest.
4. Human action is purposive
When people visit
galleries, collect art, or create works, they act purposively toward aesthetic
ends (appreciation, expression, fame, contemplation).
·
Perry’s axiology
lets you treat these aesthetic motives as purposive interests, so
the “value of art” is inseparable from the aims it serves in human life.
5. Expectation matters
Perry’s idea that
valuation depends on what one expects from an object applies
clearly to aesthetic experience.
·
A person may
expect a painting to move, challenge, or comfort them;
aesthetic value then depends partly on whether the artwork meets, exceeds, or
disrupts those expectations.
6. Governing propensity guides choice
In a person’s
hierarchy of values, aesthetic interest can be more or less
dominant: some lives are organized around art, while others subordinate it to
moral or economic concerns.
·
Perry’s “governing
propensity” helps you analyze conflicts such as when aesthetic autonomy clashes
with moral or social demands (e.g., controversial art vs. public norms).
7. Means and ends are both value‑laden
In aesthetics,
the work of art itself can be an end, while also serving means (education,
therapy, status display).
·
Perry’s
distinction lets you ask whether an artwork is valued “for its own sake”
(autonomous aesthetic value) or mainly as a tool for profit,
propaganda, or prestige (instrumental value).
8. Values can be positive or negative
Beauty is not
Perry’s only aesthetic category; he recognizes that ugliness, horror,
or dissonance can also be objects of aesthetic interest.
·
A tragic play or
disturbing image can be negatively valued in moral terms (painful,
unsettling) yet still carry high aesthetic value because it
intensifies or clarifies human experience.
In short, Perry’s
eight ideas let you treat aesthetics as a sub‑domain of axiology:
aesthetic value is just value in a special kind of interest (aesthetic
interest), subject to the same relational, interest‑based structure as moral,
economic, or social values.
Illustrate the 8 ideas a bit more with reference to the
MBA research theme of "an ethical analysis of the negative consequences of
corporate downsizing to different stakeholder groups due to adoption of AI in
business practice in the Hong Kong Banking sector"
You can use
Perry’s eight ideas to reframe “value” for each stakeholder group in
your MBA dissertation topic: “An ethical analysis of the negative
consequences of corporate downsizing to different stakeholder groups due to
adoption of AI in business practice in the Hong Kong banking sector.”
Below I sketch how
each of Perry’s ideas can be illustrated through this specific
case.
1. Value is tied to interest
In Hong Kong
banking, AI‑driven downsizing reshapes whose interests count as
“valuable.”
·
For shareholders
and top management, cutting staff with AI is “valuable” because their
interest is in cost efficiency and higher returns.
·
For retrenched
employees, that same decision is a negative value: their
interest in job security and dignity is ignored, so the same “cost saving” is
not valuable to them.
This shows how
Perry’s “X is valuable = interest is taken in X” helps you track which
stakeholder interests are foregrounded or silenced in AI‑led restructuring.
2. Value is relational, not absolute
The “value” of AI‑enabled
downsizing is not inherent in the technology itself, but in how it relates
to different stakeholders.
·
For bank
boards, the relation is between AI and profitability; downsizing appears
“rational” and “efficient.”
·
For frontline
staff and middle‑management, the relation is between AI and job loss,
reduced income, and career disruption; then the same policy looks exploitative.
Your ethical
analysis can thus map these relations: who defines what is
“valuable” and whose interests are discounted in the process.
3. Interest is more than liking
Perry’s broad
sense of “interest” as including desire, aversion, refusal, seeking,
and avoiding fits well with how workers react to AI‑driven job cuts.
·
Employees
may desire training in AI tools, but at the same time avert the
risk of being displaced.
·
Unions may refuse to
accept opaque AI‑based performance metrics as grounds for layoffs, even if
managers “like” the efficiency gains.
This helps you
argue that ethical evaluation must attend not only to overt preferences, but
also to fear, resistance, and felt threats to dignity and
livelihood.
4. Human action is purposive
Perry’s insistence
that interest is tied to purposive action lets you critically
examine the goals behind AI‑driven downsizing.
·
Banks may frame AI
adoption as aimed at “better service” and “risk control,” but the downsizing part
reveals a competing purpose: cost‑driven profit maximization.
·
When AI is used to
justify layoffs instead of reskilling, the purpose is not value‑neutral; it is
a choice privileging certain ends (short‑term efficiency) over
others (employee welfare).
Your analysis can
then ask: whose purposes are served, and whose are undermined, by this
AI‑driven restructuring?
5. Expectation matters
Perry emphasizes
that valuation depends on what a person expects from an
object.
·
Employees
may expect skill development and long‑term careers in Hong
Kong banking, but find AI‑driven restructurings instead signal precarity
and obsolescence.
·
Customers
may expect better service through AI, yet experience dehumanized
interactions or opaque automated decisions.
This lets you
build an ethical critique around unmet expectations and the
sense of betrayal when AI‑led downsizing breaks implicit career or social
contracts.
6. Governing propensity guides choice
Perry’s idea of
a governing propensity (dominant orientation shaping what is
treated as valuable) helps explain why banks keep prioritizing AI‑driven cost‑cutting.
·
A “governing
propensity” toward financial performance and shareholder value leads
banks to treat staff as variable costs rather than human beings.
·
An alternative,
more ethical propensity might prioritize social contribution, employee
well‑being, and long‑term trust in the financial system.
You can use this
to argue that ethical value change requires shifting the governing
propensity of bank leadership, not just “tweaking” AI tools.
7. Means and ends are both value‑laden
Both the AI
tools and the downsizing outcomes carry value, in
Perry’s relational sense.
·
AI is valuable as
a means to efficiency, but may be negatively valuable
when it becomes a means to dehumanize or marginalize workers.
·
Downsizing is
treated as a means to profitability, but for employees it is an end in
itself: loss of identity, status, and social role.
Your ethical
analysis can thus show that ethics must assess both the instrumental
morality of AI use and the intrinsic harm to people
whose lives are restructured without consent.
8. Values can be positive or negative
Perry’s openness
to positive and negative valuations (attraction and repulsion,
approval and disapproval) is crucial for your stakeholder‑based ethics.
·
Shareholders
may approve of AI‑driven downsizing as a rational business
move.
·
Employees,
families, and communities may disapprove of it as socially
irresponsible and unjust.
By mapping
these conflicting evaluations across stakeholder groups in
Hong Kong banking, your MBA research can show how AI‑driven downsizing
produces simultaneous winners and losers, and therefore cannot be
ethically neutral.
How this helps your MBA theme
Using Perry’s
eight ideas, you can:
·
Build a value‑based
stakeholder map showing whose interests are treated as valuable
(shareholders, regulators, AI vendors) and whose are devalued (displaced
workers, affected communities).
·
Ground your ethical
critique in the idea that AI‑driven downsizing is not “just business,”
but a value‑laden choice privileging certain governing
propensities over others.
References
Here are two academic references on
Ralph Barton Perry’s axiology that
you can cite in Harvard style for your MBA work on value‑based ethics and AI‑driven
downsizing.
1. Primary source (Perry’s own book)
Perry, R.B. (1926) General theory of value: its
meaning and basic principles construed in terms of interest. New
York: Longmans, Green and Co.
2. Secondary academic article on Perry’s value theory
Murphey, M.G. (1970) ‘Perry’s two theories of value’, The Journal of Philosophy,
67(17), pp. 613–618. doi:10.2307/2379765.
These
two will give you both Perry’s original axiology framework and
a scholarly critique/analysis of
his theory of value, which you can then connect to your stakeholder‑based
ethical analysis of AI‑driven downsizing in Hong Kong banking.
